Providing citizens access to the judicial system is a core principle of democracy. 2 In a civil action, access to the courts begins with the plaintiff's filing of a complaint. 3 To this end, for nearly fifty years our nation's courts embraced a simplified concept of pleading that rests on providing the adverse party "notice" of the allegations against them. However, the United States Supreme Court raised the pleading standard from "notice" to something more than "notice" in recent years.
In a 2007 class action antitrust case, Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 4 the Supreme Court addressed pleading requirements in federal court and overruled the well established standard enunciated in a 1957 case, Conley v. Gibson-that "a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
Although Erickson involved a pro se prisoner alleging civil rights violations, 10 a vastly different situation than Twombly, the opinion's significance was its citation of Conley and its "no set of facts" standard after Twombly. However, any speculation about the significance of the Court's reliance on Conley was unwarranted because courts have historically scrutinized pro se prisoners under a lower standard.
11 Thus, the applicability of the Twombly standard remained speculative and confusing for the judiciary, practitioners, and scholars. 12 There was much uncertainty about whether the Twombly standard would be limited to the antitrust context and how judges would define plausibility, or more generally, interpret and react to this decision. Such uncertainty was alleviated by the extension of the plausibility standard to a civil rights claim, and indeed all civil claims, in the Supreme Court's controversial Ashcroft v. Iqbal 13 decision last term. However, alleviating confusion should not be confused with better serving the interests of justice. The broadened application of Twombly has received mixed reviews in the legal community. Some view the decision as an unwarranted extension of the plausibility doctrine in the face of other fairly recent Supreme Court decisions that upheld a "notice" pleading standard in civil rights actions.
14 To others, the decision represents a justified and long overdue expansion of "heightened" pleading that will not render defendants helpless when faced with discovery costs imposed by futile complaints, particularly in the realm of complex litigation. Most agree, however, that it represents a substantial shift away from the traditional liberal "notice" pleading standard. Justice Souter, author of Twombly, reveals the juxtaposition of the two cases in the quote from his Iqbal dissent cited at the beginning of this Comment.
Some view Iqbal as the most consequential decision of the 2008-2009 term and possibly the most important in a decade for "day-to-day" litigation. 15 The controversial ruling has even instigated legislative responses with the introduction of the Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 16 and the Open Access to Courts Act of 2009. 17 Both pieces of legislation seek to undo the Twombly-Iqbal standard and reinstate the Conley standard for Rule 12(b)(6) motions. 18 Rule 12(b)(6) is the impetus for judicial rulings on the sufficiency of a complaint as it allows a party to move to dismiss for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." 19 In the wake of Iqbal, the current pleading standard is likely a product of the increasing complexity of society, industry, and the justice system in general. Within the federal judicial system, the frequency and intensity of complex litigation has vastly multiplied with large-scale toxic torts, products liability, conspiracy claims, and civil rights suits. The discovery and case management issues that accompany such litigation were part of the thrust behind the Twombly decision and its extension in Iqbal. This Comment will examine the confusion and controversy surrounding current pleading standards in federal court, demonstrate the need for change, and propose that, ultimately, the best way to resolve the issue is by amending the Federal Rules to enable complainants bringing particular causes of action to have access to "phased discovery" that allows for equitable screening of cases for lack of merit. Legislation setting forth claim-specific standards is a compelling alternative should amending the Federal Rules prove unlikely. This Comment will examine the implications of Iqbal and consider various judicial and legislative alternatives that could remedy the case's negative consequences. The practical effect of the "plausibility" pleading standard after Iqbal is to depart with traditional notice pleading and require factual allegations that are more than just consistent with impropriety. This requires a plaintiff to have a more stringent factual background than is typical under "notice" pleading. One way or another, modern pleading needs reform on some level.
Part II of this Comment will discuss the background of notice pleading through a brief discussion of the history and adoption of the "modern" pleading standard in Rule 8. An account of the general scrutiny that notice pleading has undergone in various legal areas will be described to provide context for the decisions in Twombly and Iqbal. A review of the facts, reasoning, and holdings of Twombly and Iqbal will follow.
Part III will explain how the Iqbal standard's lack of precision creates problems for the judicial system and will reveal the need for clarification. It will also note actual and potential implications of Iqbal's extension of the plausibility standard to all civil actions in federal court. An analysis of the decision's impact on removal, state law, affirmative defense pleading, and litigants' choice of forum will follow. Having established the need for a remedy, possible courses of action by both the judicial and legislative bodies will then be examined and their advantages and disadvantages assessed. The judicial and legislative alternatives are those aiming to accomplish one or more of five things: (1) judicially clarify plausibility; (2) judicially utilize current Federal Rules that enable fair case management and screening of claims; (3) legislatively specify pleading standards for specific claims; (4) amend the Federal Rules to include claim-specific standards; or (5) amend the Federal Rules to include a uniform standard that somehow accommodates the discovery and case management complexities of modern civil litigation. This Comment will conclude by recommending that, absent a clarification of the current standard that would cease denying individuals with meritorious claims access to courts, amending the Federal Rules to grant judges increased pretrial ability to manage potentially meritorious cases is a viable remedy for the pleading problem. Alternatively, legislation that creates claim-specific standards would alleviate the cost and efficiency concerns present in Twombly and Iqbal, while making courts and rulemakers rethink the application of the heightened standard.
II. BACKGROUND

A. The Origin of Notice Pleading
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 is the foundation of the federal pleading system. Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules in 1938, pleading was a technical endeavor that "served four functions: (1) providing notice of the nature of a claim or defense; (2) identifying baseless claims; (3) setting each party's view of the facts; and (4) narrowing the issues." 20 Modern pleading is only expected to execute the first function. 21 Thus, the reform executed by the adoption of the Federal Rules represented an effort to diverge from judgments on the pleadings and merely require plaintiffs to provide "notice." The drafters desired a judicial system that would not place undue emphasis on the form and substance of the pleading or value technicality over the merits of the claim.
22
Rule 8(a)(2) reflects this end by requiring that a complaint contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." 23 Charles Clark, principal architect of the original Federal Rules, was instrumental in abolishing the need for hyper-technical scrutiny of pleadings, believing a claim's merits should be fleshed out in discovery, summary judgment, or trial. As already mentioned, Conley's "no set of facts" language reigned as the prevailing standard for over fifty years until Twombly recently overruled it. Conley concerned a class action by African-American railway employees who were union members and had been demoted or fired by the railway, which stated that the positions had been abolished. 26 In actuality, the jobs were not eliminated, but filled by whites or refilled by blacks in a demoted capacity as the petitioners were laid off. 27 The black employees alleged that the union failed to represent them equally and in good faith, in violation of the Railway Labor Act. 28 The union moved to dismiss on three grounds, one being for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. 29 In adjudicating that motion, the Court applied the "no set of facts" standard to rule petitioners' allegations of concerted action by the railway and union to protect their jobs to a lesser extent than the whites was satisfactory. 30 The Court also held that a claimant is not required to "set out in detail the facts upon which he bases his claim" under the Federal Rules. 31 The Court noted that if petitioners' allegations were proven, it would constitute a patent breach of the union's statutory obligation to represent employees fairly and without discrimination. 
B. Twombly and Iqbal: Defining the New Heightened Standard
The Supreme Court applied the "no set of facts" standard consistently until the Twombly decision in 2007. In Twombly, consumers brought a putative class action lawsuit against Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers (ILECs) alleging an antitrust conspiracy, in violation of the Sherman Act, to prevent competitive entry into local telephone and Internet service markets and to avoid competing with one another in their respective markets. 43 The class alleged that the ILECs were engaged in illegal, anti-competitive parallel conduct. 44 The Court held that in a Section 1 Sherman Act allegation, the "claim requires a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest an agreement was made." 45 No such factual matter was pled, the Court held, because a mere statement of parallel conduct, even if consciously taken, "needs some setting suggesting the agreement necessary to make out a [section] 1 claim." 46 Most importantly, the Court announced a standard that only required "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." 47 The Court did away with the "no set of facts" language from Conley, stating that the "phrase is best forgotten as an incomplete, negative gloss on an accepted pleading standard: once a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations of the complaint." 48 Important language was used to describe what allegations will not stand-"a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." 49 The Court indicated the lower limits of the standard by stating that a complaint may proceed even if it strikes the "judge that actual proof of 42 52 He cited Federal Rule 26 as granting courts broad discretion in controlling discovery, including the "sequence in which such discovery devices may be deployed; and the limitations imposed on them."
53 He argued such discretion could be employed in considering the plaintiffs' proposed "phased discovery" for issues of the alleged conspiracy and class certification.
54
The Twombly decision generated much discussion about the parameters of its application. Iqbal greatly reduced this speculation. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, plaintiff Javaid Iqbal, a Muslim Pakistani, was arrested on criminal charges and detained by federal officials on suspected links to terrorist activity after the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Iqbal also alleged that both Ashcroft and Mueller "knew of, condoned, and willfully and maliciously agreed to subject" him to the confinement conditions he endured.
58 Iqbal alleged Ashcroft was the "principal architect" of the policy that designated him a high interest individual and that Mueller was "instrumental in [ Iqbal applied the new "heightened" standard in Twombly by painting with a broad brush. Writing for a five-to-four majority, Justice Kennedy discounted the distinction between the Court's interpretation of Rule 8 in Twombly's antitrust context and the civil rights situation in Iqbalnoting the transsubstantive nature of the Federal Rules. 60 He asserted that Rule 8 "governs the pleading standard 'in all civil actions and proceedings in the United States district courts.' Our decision in Twombly expounded the pleading standard for 'all civil actions,' and it applies to antitrust and discrimination suits alike." 61 The Court then elucidated a two-pronged approach to test the sufficiency of a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge to a complaint. 62 The first step is to distinguish between legal conclusions and factual allegations to identify pleadings that "are not entitled to the assumption of truth."
63 Second, the court should determine whether the factual allegations are well-pleaded so as to support the legal conclusions; if such allegations are found, the court is to "assume their veracity and determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." 64 The Court applied this two-prong test to hold that Iqbal's complaint failed to include facts that plausibly showed Ashcroft and Mueller intentionally adopted a policy of classifying detainees like Iqbal as "high interest" because of their race, religion, or national origin. 65 Notably, Justice Souter, author of the Court's opinion in Twombly, wrote the dissent in Iqbal, arguing that the majority misapplied the pleading standard set forth in Twombly.
66 Justice Souter's critique was a technical one, claiming that the majority incorrectly examined the complaint's contested allegations in isolation. 67 He accused the majority of selecting certain conclusory statements and squaring them with its treatment of other allegations as nonconclusory.
68
Like Twombly, Iqbal also discussed discovery and case management issues. Many were addressed in the Second Circuit's opinion, which held that, in a qualified immunity case, the district court may "consider exercising its discretion to permit some limited and tightly controlled reciprocal discovery so that a defendant may probe for amplification of a plaintiff's claims and a plaintiff may probe such matters as a defendant's knowledge of relevant facts and personal involvement in challenged conduct." 69 Additionally, the Second Circuit noted that a district court might wish to structure such limited discovery by examining written responses to interrogatories and requests to admit before authorizing depositions, and by deferring discovery directed to high-level officials until discovery of front-line officials has been completed and has demonstrated the need for discovery higher up the ranks.
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However, the Supreme Court's majority opinion in Iqbal reversed, noting that the trial judge's option to exercise careful case management that allows for carefully targeted discovery is unwarranted.
71
The Court's reasoning was based on Twombly's holding that on motions to dismiss, the question "does not turn on the controls placed upon the discovery process." 72 The Court gave special deference to the fact that the Iqbal defendants, petitioners Ashcroft and Mueller, are entitled to qualified immunity, because the purpose of that defense is to "free officials from the concerns of litigation, including 'avoidance of disruptive discovery.'" 73 Justice Breyer's dissent in Iqbal focused almost exclusively on the issue of discovery.
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He agreed with the Second Circuit and stated that in a qualified immunity case, "a district court, for example, can begin discovery with lower level government defendants before determining whether a case can be made to allow discovery related to higher government officials."
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Twombly and Iqbal differed on the causes of action adjudicated and the type of plaintiff. One may also note the differing political undertones of the cases. Iqbal dealt with a 9/11-era policy advanced by the Bush Administration, a more politicized issue than Twombly's class action antitrust scenario. This skepticism aside, the shifting dichotomy of the Court, from Twombly's seven-to-two decision to Iqbal's five-to-four decision, likely reflects some of the Justices' unwillingness to extend what had been perceived as a heightened standard to all civil actions. In some sense, Twombly's antitrust context provided the necessary scenario Yet, the standard's extension to all civil actions was likely not envisioned by some members of the Court at the time of Twombly.
C. Responses to the New Standard
Both the Twombly and Iqbal opinions have been heavily cited.
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This suggests two things: (1) litigants, chiefly defendants, have noted the new weapon provided to them; and (2) courts have, in part, endorsed this weapon's usage, possibly because of the desire to exercise judicial efficiency and docket control. The result of both cases has been to grant more discretion to the judiciary and leave litigants with an indistinct impression of where pleading stands today. The Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 78 and Access to Open Courts Act of 2009 79 are legislative efforts substantiating a general concern that the new standard will deprive individuals of a fair attempt at justice. In a House Judiciary Committee Meeting on October 27, 2009 entitled "Access to Justice Denied-Ashcroft v. Iqbal," several witnesses asserted that the pleading standard was too high. 80 One, in particular, went so far as to say, "A person is now barred from entering the courthouse absent being able to drum up facts that convince a federal judge-someone who breathes fairly rarified air-that her claim is subjectively plausible."
81 Such a claim is in tune with much of the criticism of modern pleading after Iqbal.
76. See Bone, supra note 24, at 884 (noting that Twombly was appropriate for dismissal on the pleadings because of its features associated with nonmeritorious filings and high discovery costs, and the fact that the allegations really did not indicate that the claim had merits).
77. 
A. Perceived and Actual Ramifications of Twombly and Iqbal
Iqbal's application of Twombly's plausibility standard in a civil rights context, indeed, in all civil actions, has caused concern among many. 82 The importance of defeating a defendant's motion to dismiss is obvious-accessing justice and having one's rights vindicated-yet, these cases have raised the stakes at this early stage in litigation. One main criticism of the Iqbal standard is that it is not consistent with the liberal principles behind notice pleading. 83 The new standard arguably prohibits plaintiffs from bringing actions based on facts they could not reasonably be expected to ascertain.
84 By rejecting Conley's "no set of facts" standard, Twombly and Iqbal effectively made a trade-off-justice for efficiency. Even if Iqbal was correctly decided on the facts, there is a danger in sustaining motions to dismiss under a plausibility standard when plaintiffs' allegations stem from organizational mistreatment and the accused are too far-removed to garner the requisite factual enhancement. Iqbal has affected cases in federal court and is likely to impact cases filed in state courts as well because rules of procedure at the state level are typically patterned on the Federal Rules. 85 Scholars have criticized the standard for its lack of clarity and precision, leaving the judiciary and litigants without a plain understanding of its meaning.
86 Some courts interpret current pleading doctrine as plainly mandating heightened pleadings, while others note a tension between the latter and notice pleading, and still others continue to endorse the traditional liberal standard. 87 The plausibility standard's goal of preventing unworthy discovery and case-management costs, as stated in Twombly, is misplaced when the standard is so unclear as to keep One procedural implication of Twombly's application to all civil actions stems from the difference between state and federal pleading standards. 89 Where possible, defendants may be more likely to seek removal in favor of the higher standard placed on complaints in federal court.
1. Inability of "Far-Removed" Plaintiffs to Substantiate Factual Matters As a preliminary matter, Iqbal has had an effect on claimants bringing lawsuits of every nature. In particular, the ability of litigants like Javaid Iqbal to successfully allege impropriety is difficult because of their inability to access crucial factual material absent some kind of discovery. In the face of the higher standard, the pleas of these claimants will be dead on arrival. Essentially, Iqbal can be viewed as denying potentially valid claims that do not yet have the requisite facts. The Court's reluctance to endorse "phased" discovery in Twombly 90 illustrates the uphill battle that claimants face. In the antitrust context, the Court made clear that only through ensuring that a complaint's allegations reach a suggestive level will enormous discovery expenses be avoided. 91 Thus, surviving a motion to dismiss can prove impossible for plaintiffs who face the need to allege specific evil motives or wrongdoings of high-level officials. 92 Even though civil rights and other similar claims are often in the context of large organizationsgovernmental, industrial, or otherwise-that involve complex claims against multiple defendants, they are still required to plead sufficient factual material to suggest their claim. These cases also have a tendency 88 . See generally Bone, supra note 82 (discussing implications of screening weak lawsuits versus meritless ones).
89. See FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., supra note 20, at 512 (noting that the Federal Rules have a "strong impact" on most states' civil procedure rules but that some "still vary greatly").
90. State courts may find the uniform application to all civil cases an attractive policy for judicial economy reasons. Conversely, states, like Arizona and Vermont, may maintain that their pleading regime is superior and demonstrate reluctance to federal influence. Various federal courts also differ in their treatment of applying the standard to affirmative defenses, which will be examined. Insofar as state courts retain a more liberal notion of pleading that rests on Conley's "no set of facts" standard or something similar, federal courts will be the likely choice of forum for defendants. One commentator has suggested that such preferences will likely come to fruition, and even detailed a specific instance of one such partiality.
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Scholars have called forum selection "the name of the game" for lawyers and removal can be a key phase in executing that selection. 101 Although, there will be limitations to removal, markedly the ability to establish that the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000 and that the parties are diverse or that there is a federal question disputed.
102 Interestingly, if the pleading dichotomy between state and federal courts actually creates this preference, it is likely that one of Twombly's stated purposes-to reduce litigation costs-will be refuted. Incentivizing removal will only result in more transactional costs to the litigant by way of more billable hours spent on pleading and peripheral costs like travel to the federal venue.
Applying "Plausibility" to Affirmative Defenses
The focus on pleading after Twombly and Iqbal centered on the complaint because both cases adjudicated a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, but courts have since addressed another implication of those decisionswhat standard to apply to defenses pled. While a minority of courts have not applied the heightened Twombly-Iqbal standard to affirmative defenses, the majority view endorses applying the standard to these pleadings. 103 This is necessary because, as one court noted, "otherwise a court could not make a Rule 12(f) determination on whether an affirmative defense is adequately pleaded under Rules 8 and/or 9 and The minority view is based on the rationale that because Twombly was interpreting Rule 8(a) and not Rule 8(b), relating to defenses generally, or Rule 8(c), relating to affirmative defenses, the heightened standard should not apply to them. 105 The majority approach is more logical considering the balance needed between pleading parties. To apply the standard to one party and not the other ignores the purpose of both pleadings-to provide notice to the other party that some plausible basis for the assertion exists. Similar to Rule 8(a)(2), Rule 8(b)(1)(A) requires the litigant to "state in short and plain terms [the party's] defenses to each claim asserted against it."
106 This similarity, coupled with the general application of Rule 8(b) to defenses, indicates that affirmative defenses should be judged by the same standard.
Disadvantages of Current Doctrine and the Need for Pleading Reform
The primary disadvantages of current pleading doctrine are the inconsistency with which it is applied, its general lack of clarity, and its divergence from traditional liberal notice pleading. The inconsistency leaves litigants guessing how the judiciary will construe "plausibility" as to the allegations of their complaint. This causes an "unpredictability that will underdeter frivolous claims and overencourage motions to dismiss." 107 The traditional principle that courts are to accept all factual allegations as true has been tainted by Twombly and Iqbal, which have caused courts to be more skeptical in their determination of whether facts are plausible.
108
When a judge exercises her discretion in construing "plausibility," she provides a more comprehensible view of her notion of that term as applied to certain facts. In doing so, it may lead to increased forum shopping by defendants. Such a preference may be particularly likely because of the complex and high stakes nature of the cases in which the 104 
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Pleading doctrine, like many legal doctrines, has always suffered from lack of clarity on some level. Inherent in legal argument is construing words to be most favorable to one's client. However, current plausibility doctrine adds something to the traditional lack of clarity that was centered on Conley's language and the word "showing" in Rule 8(a)(2); the addition of "conceivable to plausible" and related phrases leaves litigants wondering where exactly their claims fall.
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Another disadvantage is the extent to which it conflicts with the traditional doctrine of notice pleading. Twombly's emphasis on providing factual allegations showing the claimant is entitled to relief has been criticized as being counter to the understanding of the drafters of the Federal Rules. 111 There has even been speculation that the standard is at odds with Form 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
112 Form 11 does not require plaintiffs to plead facts that establish a defendant's negligence. Professor A. Benjamin Spencer, a respected scholar on the current state of pleading, uses the fundamental example of a negligence claim arising from a car wreck. Facts pled surrounding the defendant's negligence-such as use of a cell phone while driving or speeding-are not necessary to state a claim. This is because the surrounding fact of a collision creates a presumption of impropriety that gives the plaintiff the right to proceed to discovery where he has a good chance of substantiating his allegation of impropriety. 113 He further reasons that Form 11 does not require plaintiffs to allege such facts as cell phone use or speeding because they "may not be able to know [ hit from behind and had no information about the tortfeasor's contribution to the accident, his claim would fail.
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A clearer standard would provide more reliability for litigants pursuing their cases. They will not find themselves speculating about what a particular judge's idea of "plausibility" is and will have a better idea of the merits of their claim. Cases perceived to have a weak merits basis would not be excluded based on their lack of factual pleading. To be sure, a reversion to Conley may be unwarranted, but something clearer than the current standard is warranted.
B. Judicial Remedies
Having established the problems with the current pleading doctrine, the issue then becomes a suitable and effective remedy. A few exist in the judicial arena, but would require judicial activism that judges are unlikely to exercise short of a more unambiguous standard from the Supreme Court. However, the next section will further illustrate the types of issues that formal rulemaking-amending the Federal Rules or enacting claim-specific laws 116 -can help clarify.
Discretion in Defining "Plausibility"
The language of the plausibility standard provides courts discretion in determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief by noting that it will require courts to engage in a "context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." 117 Similarly, Justice Souter's dissent in Iqbal reiterated his statement in Twombly that "a court must take the allegations as true, no matter how skeptical the court may be," adding his exception for sufficiently fantastic allegations concerning little green men or time travel experiences.
118 Such a statement illustrates the level of scrutiny the author of Twombly envisioned applying to factual allegations in a complaint-one that the Iqbal majority refuted and heightened. As evident from the majority and dissent in Iqbal, judges have differing notions of plausibility. Other factors also play into a court's plausibility determination, like the errors alleged by the Iqbal dissent, namely, that Lower courts' decisions after Twombly and Iqbal also serve as evidence of such variation. 120 The term itself gives courts significant flexibility in determining whether a plaintiff is entitled to relief and is a significant reason for the lack of clarity under current doctrine. One scholar captures the need for courts to provide a clearer definition:
Concepts such as "more than labels and conclusions," "above the speculative level," "plausible grounds to infer," "enough factual material to suggest," "reasonable expectation," and "enough heft" are instructive in that they tell litigants that more than a possibility but less than a probability must be shown. Beyond that, however, there is uncertainty regarding precisely what level of factual detail will make a statement of a claim plausible and nonspeculative. Indeed, courts may disagree regarding the plausibility of a claim unless that term is given more objective definition.
121
The likelihood of courts uniting behind a clearer standard is not great considering the discretion that the plausibility standard allows. 122 The surge in applying the plausibility standard, even to cases outside of a "complex" context after Twombly, 123 suggests that some courts endorse such a standard, but nevertheless, still face the standard's lack of precision. Following Iqbal, one federal district court interpreted the Court's plausibility standard as a "highly contextual enterprisedependent on the particular claims asserted, their elements, and the overall factual picture alleged in the complaint."
124 While the obligation to follow precedent may seemingly tip the scale toward a clearer standard, the previous quote illustrates the latitude given judges in defining plausibility. The usual application of the standard would still be in favor of heightened pleading to the detriment of plaintiffs, especially in certain contexts. Because of the direction civil litigation is headed and the binding precedents of judicial discretion would remedy the more fundamental problem of the standard's application to all civil actions.
Allowance of Minimally Intrusive "Phased" Discovery
Modern complex litigation and the exorbitant discovery costs it can impose have been serious judicial considerations in defining heightened pleading standards for certain claims. In Twombly itself, the court expressed concern that "sprawling, costly, and hugely timeconsuming" 125 discovery would "push cost-conscious defendants to settle even anemic cases." 126 The Court cited one study showing that discovery can account for up to ninety percent of litigation costs if actively employed. 127 However, several commentators have challenged the Court's emphasis on discovery costs as a justification for imposing a higher standard.
128
Modifying pleading standards has an unavoidable effect on discovery and other pretrial procedures.
129 Because notice pleading rests on the idea that further investigation will flesh out the facts behind the claim, the broad means of discovery should obviate the need for parties to state facts in detail at the pleading stage. 130 With notice pleading eschewed in favor of a higher standard, it would seem appropriate that discovery be altered in some way as well. However, as detailed in Part II.B, the Iqbal Court rejected the Second Circuit's views on one possible remedy-"phased" discovery-noting that "'the success of judicial supervision in checking discovery abuse has been on the modest side.'" 131 The Court also gave substantial weight to the fact that the defendants had qualified immunity as government officials and was reluctant to burden the execution of their duties with discovery. organizational hierarchy and multiple defendants that could produce sprawling and exorbitant discovery costs. Yet, Iqbal's application to all civil actions decreases the relevance of a pervasive rejection of "phased discovery." Many instances of actionable discrimination, for example, occur in the context of mid-sized corporations, educational institutions, government agencies, or other organizations for which discovery would pose no such burden. Justifying heightened pleading based on costly discovery or burden alone is not a sufficient reason to deny plaintiffs access to courts. Federal Rule 27, as stated and interpreted by courts, recognizes a narrow allowance for presuit discovery. Iqbal's rejection of a careful case management approach seemed to be specific to the Second Circuit's instructions to the district court and did not necessarily implicate this rule. 133 The pertinent part of the rule states that "to perpetuate testimony about any matter cognizable in a United States court," an oral or written deposition may be taken to "prevent a failure or delay of justice." 134 However, courts almost uniformly construe Rule 27 as applicable in three contexts: (1) to preserve witness testimony when there is a credible risk that the testimony may be lost if not recorded immediately; (2) to confirm the proper party to name as a defendant or to gather additional information necessary to institute legal proceedings; and (3) to investigate presuit claims. 135 The best opportunity for presuit discovery to combat heightened pleading standards falls in the last context. However, few courts have allowed plaintiffs under Rule 27 to investigate potential claims or confirm the proper defendant to sue.
136 Therefore, it may be unlikely for a court, without precedent or a more explicit rule, to allow litigants to use presuit discovery to substantiate potentially meritless allegations.
Variation in states' versions of Rule 27 may also contribute to more active forum selection. 137 For example, New York's version of the rule allows claimants to gather more information necessary for commencing a legal proceeding.
138 Some other states authorize a much more extensive use of presuit discovery. Texas allows forthcoming plaintiffs to perpetuate testimony "for use in anticipated suit" or "to investigate a potential claim or suit." 139 The size of these two states is not without significance in analyzing their rules' effects on forum selection, particularly in the products liability and antitrust class action arena. More businesses are likely to have their principal place of business there and be subjected to suit in those jurisdictions. Both plaintiffs and defendants might be more inclined to seek these venues, insofar as plaintiffs believe their claims to be meritorious or defendants believe plaintiffs' claims to be without merit.
Increased Enforcement of Rule 11 to Combat Meritless Claims and Discovery Abuses
Rule 11 is another judicial mechanism that could be employed to combat the frivolous and bothersome claims that were a partial reason for the Court raising the standard. Dissenting in Twombly, Justice Stevens articulated the relevance to and availability of Rule 11 against meritless claims, stating "should it become apparent over the course of litigation that a plaintiff's filings bespeak an in terrorem suit, the district court has at its call its own in terrorem device, in the form of a wide array of Rule 11 sanctions." 140 The rule makes clear that by an attorney "presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other paper . . . an attorney certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances," the presentation is not being made to cause unnecessary delay, is not frivolous, and will have evidentiary support after a reasonable investigation.
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Rule 11 also provides the court with the ability to sanction an attorney if his or her actions are found in violation of subsection (b).
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One drawback of increasing Rule 11's use against meritless claims in the post-Iqbal era is that it would place too much pressure on attorneys to conduct a plausibility analysis from the outset. Given the difficulty and inconsistency courts themselves have had with such an analysis, the desire for claimants to have their rights vindicated should not hinge on attorneys fearing plausibility. Additionally, an attorney may never have the opportunity for "reasonable investigation" when the courts have seemingly closed the door on "phased discovery" that allows litigants to gain the now-requisite factual assertions. Rule 11 was amended in 1993 to combat a perceived "chilling effect" that was making lawyers less likely to file meritorious claims in court and disproportionately affected plaintiffs' lawyers and lawyers asserting pro bono causes. 143 These amendments, among other things, granted courts more discretion in imposing sanctions, expressly supported non-monetary sanctions, and provided that opposing parties must be served with Rule 11 motions twenty-one days prior to filing them with the court. 144 The intent of these amendments may make courts less likely to impose sanctions on plaintiffs to weed out frivolous claims rather than applying a heightened standard. Indeed, Rule 11 sanctions have been reduced in recent years and the trend is likely to continue.
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C. Amending the Federal Rules
In rulings prior to Twombly concerning Rule 8(a)(2), the Supreme Court acknowledged that certain claims might be subjected to a heightened requirement if "Rules 8 and 9 were rewritten today," adding that such a ruling would have been attained by the "process of amending the Federal Rules."
146 Similarly, in Crawford-El v. Britton, the Court responded to the appellate court's rationale of imposing a heightened standard to reduce the access to discovery in actions that require proof of motive.
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It noted that issues concerning pleading, discovery, and summary judgment are "most frequently and most effectively resolved either by the rulemaking process or the legislative process." 148 Obviously, these acknowledgements are noteworthy, given the Supreme Court's actions in both Twombly and, to a greater extent, Iqbal. Even in Twombly, the Court stated that they were not applying a heightened standard and that doing so would require an amendment of the Federal Rules, not judicial interpretation. 149 The more even split of the Court in Iqbal than in Twombly likely reflects the Court's previously stated reluctance to promulgate a ubiquitously heightened standard from the bench. Because there are both judicial and legislative elements involved in amending the Federal Rules, 150 this discussion stands apart as a sort of hybrid. To be sure, it is largely influenced by the judicial sector. "Judicial," in this sense, means judges, lawyers, and academicsindividuals who day in and day out observe trends in practice and in theory. The power to amend the Federal Rules is found in the Rules Enabling Act, first adopted in 1934, which states, "The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice . . . for cases in the United States district courts . . . and courts of appeals." 152 This rule is considered by the Advisory Committee, composed of judges, lawyers, and academics, which either approves or rejects the proposal. 154 It is then reviewed by the Judicial Conference, which forwards it to the Supreme Court, which, upon its approval, sends it to Congress, where it will become law unless that body exercises its veto power within seven months. 155 The input of judges, lawyers, and legal academics would be of great value to any revision of the pleading rules. To the extent that judges' past attempts at approving a heightened pleading standard for certain causes of action were rooted in an effort to screen meritless claims, their input is of obvious value in the amendment process. Judges, as well as practitioners, know the practical challenges facing the court as an institution in matters of judicial economy and docket control. Also, adequate public involvement is permitted through open hearings, invitations, and solicitations of participation.
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There are three ways, or a combination thereof, in which the Federal Rules could be amended to resolve the current pleading issue. First, there could be an amendment that uses language to exact a pleading requirement in Rule 8 which clarifies or negates the notion of plausibility in the current standard. Second, there could be an amendment to Rule 9 to capture certain causes of action where plausibility or a similarly heightened standard should apply, like antitrust. Third, Rules 16 (case management), 26 (regarding pretrial disclosures), and 27 (regarding perpetuating testimony) could be revised and emboldened to allow more equitable case screening by the judiciary through management of presuit discovery that ferrets out frivolous claims. The attractiveness of amending Rule 8 to clarify the current standard is that any language accomplishing it would, in tone with current language, likely remain brief and facially understandable. However, further examination would likely reveal the same linguistic ambiguities that "short and plain" have presented, as well as the vagueness of the current plausibility standard. 157 Articulation of a more complex standard would be contrary to the idea that pleading should be accessible to the everyday litigant and a simple matter of notice.
The second way is to amend Rule 9(b) to encompass the types of litigation in need of a heightened standard. Yet a claim-specific standard would conflict with Rule 1, which states that the scope and purpose of the Federal Rules is to "govern the procedure in all civil actions and proceedings." 158 Additionally, the reasons that Rule 9 exists-"protection of reputation, deterrence of frivolous or strike suits, defense of completed transactions, and providing adequate notice" 159 -do not comport with the purpose of providing uniform clarity. For these reasons, those involved in the amendment process may be hesitant to endorse more specific causes of action that fall under a heightened standard via the Federal Rules. Doing so would be an unruly taskcertain types of claims will not always embody the kinds of facts necessary for heightened pleading under Rule 9's "fraud or mistake" language. As already noted, a wide range of factual pleading requirements already seem to exist for certain types of litigation.
160 Rule 9(b)'s language was meant to encompass common-law fraud claims that are quite different from modern fraud claims, like securities fraud. 161 Reducing these causes of action into a Federal Rule would be difficult for a couple reasons. First, the causes of action that may be subject to the amended rule vary so greatly that it would be impracticable to craft a single rule. 162 Secondly, many causes of action that might fall under the rule, like antitrust, are based on statutes that are subject to legislation.
Such legislation could be amended but that would necessitate an amendment to the Federal Rules, and an unworkable and impractical system.
Additionally, finding language suitable to encompass modern statutory fraud claims would suffer from the same simplified language problem as Rule 8.
The third option is to amend case management and discovery rules to allow for more equitable screening of cases. Insofar as courts do not construe Rule 27 liberally, it could also be amended to enable litigants to more easily pursue limited discovery to deal with a specified set of claims where the plaintiff cannot reasonably be expected to have the necessary facts to supplement allegations.
Several scholars have argued that under the current standard, fairness reasons justify allowance for minimally intrusive presuit discovery. 163 The use of minimally intrusive discovery should be allowed in circumstances where, in the court's judgment, the plaintiff could not have reasonably been expected to access such facts necessary for the requirement. The judiciary's judgment would allow courts to ferret out what they view as a fishing expedition in favor of more wholesome claims. Generally, this notion is congruent with Federal Rule 16, which gives the court broad case management abilities. 164 Another proposed supplemental policy that would help sort claims before the court is to shift the costs, or a fraction of the costs, to the plaintiff. 165 Such a policy would need to be tempered to find a burden that would not be so heavy as to prevent plaintiffs from bringing suits, even if their merits were worthy, or so weak as to sustain the frivolity of plaintiffs to bring a meritless claim.
Practically, amending discovery rules may be an easier task than pleading rules. The brevity of the current pleading rules suggests an effort to keep things uniform and simple. This effort is in line with the traditional notice theory, but nonetheless quite complicated and more controversial. Conversely, discovery rules are extensive and detailed to account for the various discovery methods and to prevent their abuses. This provides an avenue for more explicit guidance to the judiciary and 162. See generally Fairman, supra note 22 (detailing the causes of action to which a heightened standard of pleading has been applied).
163. practitioners. While the effect of amending discovery rules means imposing a higher adaptive curve on the judiciary and practitioners, both have made such adjustments before. Additionally, the use of presuit discovery is beneficial to both parties. If implemented, the role of the judge in defining "plausibility" is circumvented, providing for more effective screening and adequate assessment of seemingly nonmeritorious claims. In multi-defendant litigation, such discovery can provide an economical benefit by preventing some parties from having meritless claims brought against them and narrowing the field of defendants.
Generally, this rulemaking process would shield the proposal from interest-group influence and devious political pressures to a greater extent than congressional legislation. 166 It is also likely to be a less politically charged issue because it addresses the Twombly-Iqbal paradigm more discreetly. Rather than amending the rules causing controversy in those cases, it changes rules that promise benefit for both parties in litigation. Amending discovery and case management practice under the Federal Rules is the best of the three options considered. Absent such amendments, the next best alternative is claim-specific legislation.
D. Legislative Remedies
As mentioned in Part II.B, Twombly and Iqbal concerned complex claims and legal issues, but managed to raise the pleading standard for all civil actions. This judicial process has had the effect of what one scholar likens to a "Cadillac process . . . [that] helps to drive out of federal court those who can afford only a Ford."
167 Decisions concerning such policyrelated issues, like access to courts, are properly left to the formal rulemaking bodies like the legislature or those involved in the rule amendment process. These processes ensure adequate input and contribution from the legal community. A statute that clears the confusion about the pleading standard may be preferable for several reasons. Principally, the law would be democratic in its representation of the will of the people and would draw on testimony from the judiciary and legal scholars to create a less confusing and more viable standard. The legislative process would ensure that all parties were heard, 166 . See Bone, supra note 82, at 38-39 (noting the insulation of the rulemaking committees from political pressure).
167. See Burbank, supra note 92, at 563. accounting for and accurately reflecting societal and judicial needs. 168 In accommodating public input on these matters, the public would have increased confidence in the judiciary, which is increasingly viewed as a product "not only of the political process, but of ordinary politics." 169 A few legislative options exist to improve the current standard. First, Congress could enact legislation that substantiates a claim-specific standard for an area or a related range of areas. These standards could be more stringent, like Rule 9, or be in the mold of PSLRA's pleading standard. 170 Second, Congress could, as it is currently contemplating, enact legislation that returns to the pre-Twombly and Iqbal standard, by making clear the threshold by which 12(b)(6) motions will be granted or the standard by which claims will be allowed under Rule 8.
To some extent, Iqbal affirmed the direction that lower federal courts were already headed in after Twombly. 171 Many pre-Iqbal opinions read Twombly as being generally applicable to all federal cases. 172 For example, cases involving religious discrimination, 173 Federal Housing Administration violation, 174 and employment discrimination 175 all applied Twombly's standard prior to Iqbal. This suggests some courts may have viewed the application of a newer, heightened standard as overdue and necessary for judicial efficiency. Such partiality signals a judicial perception that something needs to be done to combat frivolous claims that burden not only the court but other litigants. Because the cases that typically impose such burdens involve more complex claims, a specific legislative standard for them may be a viable alternative.
Legislation Prescribing Claim-Specific Standards
As noted in Part II, supra, resistance to notice pleading in various areas of the law existed prior to Twombly's overruling of Conley and Iqbal's extension to all civil actions. 176 This resistance was present in the KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
years following the implementation of the pleading system, but, after Conley, notice pleading ended the speculation about whether the liberal rules were genuine in application. 177 At times, courts challenged its application in various contexts; at other times, legislative action would alter pleading standards for specific types of claims. The latter was the case with the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) passed by Congress in 1995, over presidential veto, to combat frivolous lawsuits in the private securities arena.
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Since its inception, PSLRA has received its share of criticism. 179 These negative reviews largely center around deciphering the heightened scienter requirement and confusing legislative history.
180 Such criticisms could be particular to the securities fraud context and should not deter future pleading legislation.
The enactment of PSLRA came after industry groups complained of frivolous "sue now, discover later" suits, comparable to the one in Twombly, that classes of plaintiff investors were entitled to file.
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Congress required that plaintiffs plead misleading statement and omission claims with particularity as well as conforming with the scienter requirement.
182 Discovery is also not allowed while a motion to dismiss is pending. 183 The application of PSLRA has received criticism similar to Iqbal in that it requires a plaintiff to plead facts only the defendant possesses, without the benefit of some kind of discovery. 184 These mishaps of the PSLRA and its application should serve as lessons for lawmakers.
Legislative reform is preferable to judicial analysis from the bench. As already noted, reliance on binding judicial interpretation and precedence is not an efficient and resourceful way to go about changing the standard when it implicates greater policy and social concerns. Iqbal's civil rights action is a primary illustration of one such concern. Cases that have the effect of adjudicative policymaking lack the educated and needed input of lower court judges, practitioners, academics, and the public, making it generally undemocratic. The Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009 or, alternatively, the Access to Open Courts Act of 2009, proposes to retract the current judicial interpretation of Rule 8(a) and essentially restore the application of Conley to 12(b)(6) motions. The success of that bill's current language is unlikely because of the simplicity of the standard. Reverting back to Conley for all civil actions would reflect a poor assessment of the modern demands of litigation. As illustrated by Twombly, allowing plaintiffs to impose exorbitant discovery costs on defendants by way of a claim that does not withstand judicial plausibility is unjust. Another perceived hurdle to such legislation is the political clout among interest groups favoring the standard that may be exerted to influence legislators. The perception of "anemic" claims withstanding judicial scrutiny will bolster the opposition of economically powerful organizations like corporations. Of course, groups advocating liberal notice pleading-the plaintiff's bar and civil rights organizations like the NAACP-will also be heard. Such participation is appropriate because of the political stakes. These competing interests signify one benefit of the proposed legislation in that it makes this core democratic issue more publicized and provides more opportunity for public input, generating a more productive discussion.
However, any compromise that reflects the needs of modern litigation is unlikely under the Bill's current language that promotes "the standards set forth by the Supreme Court of the United States in Conley v. Gibson."
185 It is not likely that the simplicity of the language will generate the extended discussion necessary to account for current complex litigation needs of the type encountered in Twombly.
Some commentators have already weighed in on the legislation. One proposes a redraft of the bill to include much of the language that refutes the language used in Twombly and Iqbal:
[A] Federal court shall not deem a pleading inadequate under rule 8(a)(2) or rule 8(b)(1)(A) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, on the ground that such pleading is conclusory or implausible, except that a court may take judicial notice of the implausibility of a factual allegation. So long as the pleaded claim or defense provides fair notice of the nature of the claim or defense, and the allegations, if taken to be heightened pleading is economic (assessing economics of pleading practice and cost-shifting analyses), a comprehensive survey of cases and litigation costs will need to be considered. Academics and institutional scholars are the most ideal lot for such an empirical task. The ability of a wronged person to "have their day in court" is a serious matter that goes to the heart of our democracy.
Legislation that assigns heightened standards to those causes of action Congress deems ripe for such a standard is the best of the purely legislative alternatives. The fact that both Twombly and Iqbal were cases involving highly complex claims in complex organizational contexts is significant because it is precisely these areas where claim-specific legislation would have the greatest effect. However, such legislation still poses the question of what to do with other cases still subjected to the plausibility standard.
Absent a clarification of this issue or a circumvention of it, like more equitable case management, legislation is simply not enough. The process of amending the Federal Rules ensures more logical language and ease in application. Additionally, legislative reform may be unlikely to attract adequate public attention, especially among matters such as healthcare and Afghanistan, and may not generate a meaningful legislative process.
IV. CONCLUSION
The current state of pleading doctrine places some plaintiffsparticularly far-removed plaintiffs-in an unjust place that is contrary to democratic principles. While the advantages of economic and judicial efficiency have seemingly been at the forefront of modern pleading reform, such priorities are at odds with the declared purpose of pleading under the Federal Rules. No doubt these concerns are worthy, but at what cost? Are the complexities of society and desire for judicial economy enough to justify modern pleading doctrine? For the sake of those suffering the improprieties of others, often the powerful, such justifications are improper. The best solution to the plausibility problem would be amending the Federal Rules to allow for more efficient case management early in the lawsuit and limited discovery to test good-faith conclusory allegations. This path avoids the ambiguous language problems of the plausibility standard and, politically, is likely to have more success than other amendment alternatives. Alternatively, claimspecific legislation that imposes heightened standards for those causes of action most associated with economic and judicial inefficiency is a viable remedy for the application of the current standard. KANSAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 58
In the wake of Twombly, Iqbal made it harder for not only farremoved individuals suffering from information asymmetry, but also those closely engaged with their adversaries, to bring a complaint that would survive the pleading stage. 188 The extension of plausibility pleading is too strict and at odds with the traditional notion of notice pleading. Further, litigants suffer from a lack of clarity in this evolving pleading standard. Such imprecision can create higher transactional costs and burdens for both parties-a result at odds with the notions of judicial and economic efficiency that were behind Twombly. Iqbal's reach to all civil actions could have other procedurally inefficient implications, like defendants seeking a federal venue or a particular state venue to avail themselves of a favorable application of the current standard. The ability of the judiciary to provide a clearer definition than plausibility and allow for minimally intrusive discovery under current law is limited.
Absent formal rulemaking, action by the judiciary will be inefficient. Thus, legislative action is the preferred method of remedying the negative effects of Twombly and Iqbal. Pleading standards are a question of policy that is best left to the formal rulemaking process promulgated under the Rules Enabling Act or through legislation. Access to courts is too important in our democracy not to conform to the democratic will.
